

Concept of operations: Purpose of Annex is to provide Pacific Fleet Commanders with information required for formulation of supporting plans and for the exercise of command initiative in situations where recourse to higher authority may be physically impossible of execution or incompatible with the existing situation...A temporary partial or complete loss of communications capability is a possible consequence of the use of nuclear weapons. Loss of comm. could occur prior to the formal execution of the general emergency operations plans. To provide for the contingency wherein loss of command communications capability occurs, general emergency op. plans must be developed in adequate detail to be capable of implementation with minimum communications.

...All defensive tasks are to be executed in the event of a surprise attack or upon receipt of a tactical warning from a reliable source that indicates that an enemy attack has been launched, is under way, or has occurred. Prepare to accomplish all other tasks. ...It is not expected that an attack will completely deny for an extended period, the means for communicating the authority to initiate an all-out attack on the enemy. Therefore, Annex E will not be executed until specific authority for its implementation has been received.

Summary of JSCP objectives; including specifically deterrence of China.

Limited war may cause deployment bad for general war. Hence, intelligence needed to permit timely redeployment.

Emphasis on spectrum of actions, plans.

Enemy air delivery targets first priority; subs next.

Marines: 2 squadrons (40 AC) on Japan.. List of CINCPAC atomic capable forces.

Atomic ops will be conducted and controlled by CINCPAC through the component commanders, except when operational control of atomic capable forces is passed to joint task force commanders or exercised under the direction of subordinate unified commanders.

In the early stages of general war, atomic coordination procedures may fail because of disrupted communications. The Fleet Commander who has access to atomic weapons suballocated to him will destroy targets as required by this Plan despite the lack of communications and subject to the receipt of authentic indication that the President has authorized the employment of atomic weapons.

CS will exercise sufficient control of weapons expenditures to:

1) provide a ready accounting to the CS for all atomic weapons allocated, including:

a) weapons remaining available.

b) weapons expended

c) purpose for which expended.

2) Minimize interference between atomic delivery forces.

3) Achieve maximum military effort in the delivery of atomic weapons.

4) Minimize overbombing, insure appropriate atomic targets are not overlooked and that ineffective action is not taken by one force through ignorance of the actions of another.

5) That appropriate forces having delivery capability and atomic weapons are promptly available to and in support of commanders as specified by the CCS.

To achieve a minimum response time would inevitably result in increased denial mobility and would require continuous operations in areas of high search and attack intensity. To insure that the Pacific Fleet forces have the highest 'survival quotient' and probability of response to attack, the fleet must maximize its mobility and flexibility.

Weapons assigned but not suballocated may not be expended until authorized by CINCPACFLT; except when subordinate commanders are unable to communicate with him or higher authority or when comm. delays are unacceptable. Then, having received authority to expend weapons, commanders may use reserves as required.

It is recognized that a disaster could occur which could result in the loss of the fleet.

CINCPAC reserve of JCS allocated weapons (not more than 20%; remainder sub-allocated to component commanders):

for use in operations short of general war; targets of opportunity; unconventional warfare

CINCPAC reserve weapons assigned to component commanders may not be used except by the direction of CINCPAC. In event of emergency, due to lack of time to communicate or loss of communications, component commanders may use the CINCPAC reserve in accordance with policies in annex and plan.

((CHECK; is this means of controlling atomic ops short of general war? ~~can~~ Precisely when can component commanders use reserves? Are all CINCPAC reserve weapons assigned to component commanders?))

Objective of CINCPAC UW plans is to exploit the chaotic conditions resulting from the atomic attacks. infiltration of indigenous special forces into areas which have been attacked with atomic bombs and disorganized; rally indigenous elements opposed to Communist regime before enemy security control could be re-established.

Also, profitable pin-point targets such as bridges, tunnels, power plants, difficult to attack by conventional means.

Only US personnel will employ man portable atomic demolitions

because of unpredictable extent of downwind fall-out, surface bursts programmed only when required for necessary damage to underground or other hard essential target, or when contamination effects essential (e.g., alternative undertakings).

JCS established worldwide constraint policy on fallout; high-yield surface burst attacks have been coordinated on a world-wide basis and will not be changed without CINCPAC authority. Lower yield surface bursts may be programmed subject to constraints; overriding military necessity.

To avoid alienation of potentially friendly populations in satellites and fringe areas (and allies), minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction; constraints on residual radiation from all drops, to limit expected dose.

Each target on CINCPAC target lists is assigned to one, sometimes two, component commanders; enemy atomic delivery targets assigned both to CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF. ((What about SAC?)) But try to reduce possibility that two actual attacks will be delivered.

Short of general war, UW use of Atomic Demolition Munitions allows precise placement and limits excessive destruction; tactical and psychological importance. Initial strikes against psychological-political forces may provide necessary show of intent and strength to dissuade the enemy from further aggression.

((Control? Possible SU use? SU threat? US threat as deterrent?))

Psychological-political targets: fixed military installation adjacent to large population centers; weapons carefully applied to destroy military targets; exploit psych advantage of swift and effective use of atomic weapons

Authority to expend atomic weapons is granted by presidential declaration. CINCPAC and/or component commanders may received this authority:

- 1) CINCPAC may receive direct from JCS
- 2) CINCPAC may received direct from CNO as member of JCS
- 3) Component commanders may receive from CI CPAC
- 4) Component commanders may receive from Chiefs of their service as members of JCS. Notification of component commanders by Service Chiefs is back up procedure to CINCPAC notification.
- 5) Notification by any authenticated source listed above is authority to expend these sub-allocated weapons in accordance with the applicable plan

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It is recognized that a disaster could occur which would disrupt normal operational and command channels...thus precluding the transmission of notification and weapon release instructions to affect implementation of emergency war plans....Should the time come when it is apparent to a commander that he must proceed on his own initiative, he must take such courses of action, based on the info at his disposal, as appears to best suit the national interest. Prior planning, a complete understanding of his mission, and common sense are the considerations that a commander must consider in reaching his decision.

primary emphasis placed on planning for contingency: SU surprise attack. Initial phase of operations will be decisive; will determine ultimate outcome. For planning purposes, initial phase is considered to extend from D-day through the first month.

In event of a surprise attack when US and allied forces do not have the initiative, attack activity will be directed to striking targets that will cause maximum disruption; government and military control centers, population centers, communications centers, neutralization of skilled labor and high priority nuclear weapon delivery capability. When US and allied forces have strategic warning, activity will be directed to the elimination of Soviet long-range nuclear weapon delivery capability, attainment of air superiority, containment of Soviet air-ground offensives, destruction of Soviet war sustaining facilities, and isolation and elimination of deployed Soviet and Satellite military forces.

Unfavorable and most probable condition is Tactical Warning: no knowledge of impending attack prior to enemy penetration of friendly early warning radar. Strategic Warning: optimum condition when pre-Day mobilization occurs as a result of increased world tension and local hostilities and sufficient warning is received to carry out required unplanned pre-strike operations; could be degraded to a maximum of four hours. Tactical Warning will be planned to cause max dis-

Priorities of targets under Tactical Warning will be planned to cause max disruption: alternative undertakings.

SU-FE: 15 heavy bombers, 189 mediums (Bison, Badger); some Bu ls. 12 primary bomber bases, 22 alternate bombers bases. 450,000 troops

CCAF: 20 Bu 1s, 400 Beagles. 2 primary bomber bases, 16 alternate bomber bases.

Recon missions planned to accomplish strike evaluation within 15 minutes--3 hours after strike.

5th AF: maintain capability to commence launch of atomic forces in Japan within one hour of receipt of complete nuclear weapons.

315th Air Division: maintain sufficient aircraft on a continuous 30-minute departure alert at Kadena and Central AB, loaded with weapons and/or nuclear capsules for delivery of first wave requirements to bases in Japan.

Quick Strike concept is primarily designed to meet requirements of alternative undertakings. (These call for ~~the~~ neutralization of atomic delivery capability where possible).

Objective for Tactical Warning: 70% of all possesses aircraft on strike sorties within 4 hours. (alert within 15 minutes).

Def. of tactical warning: the type of warning that may be received from the moment of actual launch of enemy aircraft and missiles with the intent to attack the US or her allies until the time that enemy weapons begin to detonate on targets within the US or other friendly territories. ...may occur in an atmosphere of complete surprise (without any previously recognized strategic warning) or after a period of recognized strategic warning.

Basic or standard strike plan for PACAF forces will be termed NREEMAL and will provide for execution of general war under tactical warning, no notice conditions, against alternative undertaking targets. Targets from alternative undertaking list and primary undertaking list.

Variation: a) Primary strike b) an: against primary undertakings only. Retarget planes whose alternative undertaking targets are not primary targets.

b) Deployed strike plan: in case sufficient warning is available to preposition

Purpose of alternative undertakings:

To provide for general war initiated under disadvantageous conditions when the available US forces are considered insufficient, due to enemy action or otherwise, for the accomplishment of the above undertakings...

1) First priority will be accorded to the destruction of major population centers and of primary government controls within the USSR and China to the extent necessary to neutralize the capability of the USSR and China to carry on the war. Concurrently, neutralization of atomic delivery capabilities will also be undertaken with remaining available means.

If, because of enemy action or otherwise, the capability of US forces is so limited as to indicate that US atomic retaliatory forces could not possibly achieve military objectives by means of the primary initial phase undertakings...

The JCS will from time to time determine and direct whether the primary or the alternative initial phase undertakings shall automatically apply in case of Soviet surprise attack. (Ann: They will)

((So CINCPAC must remain capable to inform JCS of status, so they can decide.))

Except for alternative undertakings, employment of atomic weapons will be designed to accomplish military objectives with the maximum overall effectiveness tempered as feasible by provision for: 1) adequate but not excessive weight of attack; 2) retention of adequate reserves of weapons; 3) avoidance of preventable waste of weapons and weapon systems; 4) reduction of civil destruction and civilian casualties to the minimum compatible with the accomplishment of military objectives;

and of alternative undertakings; to accomplish maximum disruption with the USSR, to prevent further enemy atomic assault and to retard or halt enemy land, air and naval operations, to the extent feasible within the capability of the limited strike forces expected to be available for immediate employment. Targets chosen to cause maximum disruption to major industrial urban areas, populations and political control centers. Surface bursts. general deterioration.

In general, minimize civilian damage; further limit attacks in satellite countries where it is desirable to capitalize on opposition to USSR or China by government, forces, or population.

In conflict short of general war: because of limited nature and the extreme importance of preventing such a conflict from expanding into general war, the JCS will at the time provide policy guidance for the use of atomic weapons. Once the authority for their employment has been given, maximum decentralization of authority for execution of operational plans can be expected. ((NOTE))

Overall: 150R :

When atomic weapons are used in operations short of general war, it is anticipated that CINCPAC will direct and closely control each atomic strike in the initial stages. If appropriate, CINCPAC subsequently may decentralize control of atomic strikes, subject to specific restrictions.

((HOW WILL HE CONTROL?))

PACOM Operations Liaison Office (POLO).

ATPOS (post strike reports) submitted hourly; except targets with pre-planned duplications, submitted by EMERGENCY message.

Anti-sub, air defense, close support atomic operations submitted every 12 hrs.

((How does DEFCON affect strike plans?)) 3 strike plans: Day-good weather; night-bad weather; alternative undertakings.

ATION: atomic situation message; initiated by CINCPAC to inform strike force commanders of case of interference or duplication, and directing action.

Standards: Flash--5 minutes; Emergency-20 minutes; Operational Immediate--30 min.

Broadcast procedure for atomic coordination: 3 minutes before drop, at drop: UHF.

JCS allocate weapons to CINCPAC for use in general war; CINCPAC assigns them to component commanders for physical custody, maintenance, security and readiness; CINCPAC sub-allocates a portion of these assigned weapons to component commanders for use in general war (commander needs only an authenticated "use" message to expend these weapons). Difference between weapons assigned and weapons sub-allocated constitutes CINCPAC's reserve--can't be used without authority from CINCPAC.

Approving authority: commander authorized to approve the expenditure of specified atomic weapons.

Goals of SOP: to increase effectiveness of PACOM forces through coordinated atomic strike plans (pre-strike planning and coordination); minimize interference; minimize reliance on communications immediately prior to and during atomic operations; provide info for command decision.

IN SOP PACAF

Lack of fuel, weather, navigation errors, etc., may prevent pilot from reaching primary target; or he may observe target to be destroyed. He will have an alternate target assigned, and be briefed to strike it instead.

Before hostilities, TOT's reported in hours and minutes from E-hour. After hostilities TOT's submitted as DTG ZULU time.

ATPOS reports submitted: by OI message as soon as operations permit, for targets with preplanned duplication; others, as operations dictate, normally not more frequent than hourly.

Strike plans submitted: normal with 7 variations:

- a) primary day-good weather
- primary night/AW
- c) Normal day/good weather
- d) normal night/AW
- e) deployed primary day/good weather
- f) deployed primary night/AW
- g) deployed ~~ix~~ day/good weather
- h) deployed night/AW

Normal and primary strike plans based on tactical warning; deployed strike plans based on strategic warning. After E-hour, strike plans no longer valid will be cancelled.

Spark Plug procedures are only method by which Quick Strike forces may initially be launched or initially directed to expend. They provide for automatic launch of High Gear force whenever launch of the QS force is directed, but are not the only way the HG force may be launched.

"Launch": take off, proceed to preplanned orbit points and await instructions; if authentic expend message does not arrive prior to fuel decision time (interrogate ground station, then) return to take off base or other point as directed.

High Gear launch: execute weapons delivery.

Presidential authority to use atomic weapons is implicit in an authenticated CRICPAC EAF C-4 message, and in an authentic Spark Plug expend message. On receipt of former, Commander Fifth AF and 13th AF will issue expend messages, and Com 5th AF will launch HG.

Also, these two can launch their forces as a precautionary measure under circumstances where attack appears beyond a reasonable doubt to be imminent or underway. Subordinate commanders can also do this, only provided that communications with the appropriate numbered AF commander are lost.

Double envelope: 1) outside it tells series. 2) if message gives correct series, open envelope; face of inner envelope gives first two phonetic code letters; if these correspond to first two letters in message, "Launch"; if message is received then (or later) containing four letters, first two of which correspond to those on face of inner envelope, open inner envelope; if card inside has all four letters, "Expend" weapons on assigned target.

Several series of envelopes are issued; series in effect will be changed at random intervals by Hq PACAF.

Where feasible, and in order to reduce probability of inadvertent or unauthorized act, envelope should be opened while in the presence of at least one other person who is knowledgeable to Spark Plug procedures (cannot be applied to airborne bomb commanders). If the envelope is to be opened in response to a Spark Plug communication, the message should be known to both parties before the envelope is unsealed. Verification against envelope contents should be accomplished jointly.

Messages will identify the undertaking (primary or alternative) in clear text. If undertaking is not known, authority directing the action will assume the alternative undertaking applies and direct forces accordingly. Once the undertaking is specified there will be no subsequent change.

Duty officers receiving C-4 message, authenticate it, issue appropriate SP message, call subordinate units by most expeditious voice circuit and repeat same SP message, dispatch PACAF EFP message on order. (in "launch only" situation, announce DEFCOM 1). Notify appropriate commanding officer.

If PACAF sends SP expend message, it will follow shortly by EFP execution order. If 5th AF or 13th AF received authentic SP expend message, they will issue EFP execute. If PACAF or others issue SP launch only message, they will follow ~~with~~ with DEFCOM 1.

Messages are sent unclassified on UHF from operations facilities, air defense sites and control towers. (Crew may request message via UHF from these facilities). Crew monitors specified frequency throughout flight.

On receipt of message, facilities will transmit message in clear immediately and at designated time intervals for one hour, unless directed to stop.
(WHILE PILOTS TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO EACH OTHER?)

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Variation: a) Primary strike plan: against primary undertakings only. Retarget planes whose alternative undertaking targets are not primary targets.

b) Deployed strike plan: in case sufficient warning is available to preposition forces to forward operating areas to enhance strike profiles. Altern and primary.

c) Deployed-Primary strike plan.

48 B-57s on Johnson AFB; 225 F-100s on Itazuki, Misawa, Kadena, Clark; missiles on Tainan, Korea.

DEFCON 5, 4, 3: be able to launch all operationally ready aircraft on strike sorties within 6 hours.

Defcon 2: Deploy strike forces when directed; man PACAF advance hq. at Kure; augment POLO; increase number of aircraft on Quick Strike to 1/3 of possessed force; load up available weapons; 80% of aircraft operationally ready; be able to launch all these within two hours.

DEFCON 1: Execute weapons movement schedules, on order; increase Quick Strike to 1/2 of force; prepare in Japan; be able to launch all operationally ready within 30 minutes

Korea: Com attack might begin with fabricated but plausible incident against Com forces.

Com objectives: a) To overrun South Korea, or b) to cause the UN/US to commit additional forces in South Korea in connection with pre-planned actions elsewhere in the free world.

For psychological advantage, Coms would probably not use atomic weapons, at least until used against them.

US should use atomics, if such use will bring aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on balance of political and military consideration, such use best advance US security interests. It is assumed that ~~XXXX~~ PACOM would be authorized to use them.

If used, restrict them to ensure: accomplishment of mission; minimize destruction; localize conflict so far as possible; Communists have an opportunity to capitulate locally in Korea before the hostilities are unduly expanded.

Partial implementation of plan: if reinforcements not available; if nuclear weapons are not allowed. (Counterattack phase may be infeasible; withdrawal may be required).

With 2 mile CEP and .5 MT warhead, Polaris will be used against primary governmental control centers and industrial base of SU and China. List of 156 target complexes in Russia (28 will not be targeted now) and 25 in China.

Maintain 55% of all Polaris subs submerged in patrol areas ready to fire. Early ones in Norwegian Sea. (alternate: Med). Later: WestPac.

Total sub force needed (55% on patrol) for unilateral destruction of target complexes: 75 in Western Russia—26; 118 in Western SU—36; 128 in Western and Eastern SU—40; 153 in Russia and China—47.

Control and coordination by unified commanders in the area, through their naval component commanders. (initially CINCLANT). (later CINCEUR, CINCPAC).

Advantages of Polaris:

1) Insures inevitable retaliation; 2) system is flexible—missiles can be launched promptly, or with deliberation; 3) compared to other systems, it will be immune to surprise attack, thus insuring ability to deliver weapons carried; 4) does not depend on vulnerable warning and defense systems for survival; 5) because of high survivability, possible to realistically establish long-range force and budgetary requirements; 6) system is independent of foreign control; 7) forces can easily be redeployed in response to national requirements; 8) blunting attacks against Polaris subs will not endanger US populations.

In Westpac: out of 26 on patrol, 2 against SU targets, 4 against ~~SEAS~~ Chicom targets.

VLF stations: Maryland, T.H., Washington; one under lease in Japan; maintenance station at Haiku, T.H. and Balboa, Panama Canal Zone; one under construction at Washington County, Maine; one planned for Guam.

Limited or finite target system (possible because of SU concentration) which, if attacked, would destroy the Soviet will to continue the war.

10 USSR targets in Far East.

First SSBN will be supported from CONUS (Norway is closest patrol area); Norwegian Sea offers, initially, more reliable communications; navigational aids are equal to those in Med; politically, desirable to locate first tender in UK port rather than any other ally.

Second group should operate in Med.

Require 1/3 fatalities with 90% confidence; assume system reliability of 80%, attrition due to enemy countermeasures of 5%; total system degradation, hence, of 25%. Air burst.

National requirements: a) to deter Sino-Soviet authority from calculated resort to general war, by threat of reducing its industrial and governmental control base to a state of impotency; b) If general war is forced upon us, to reduce the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a condition which will permit the US to survive as a world leader and pursue its remaining objectives.

US will not rely overly on any single weapon system to meet requirements; this would simplify enemy's problems and he would know where to direct his counter-efforts.